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Abstract
It is not clear what a system for evidence-based common knowledge should look like if common knowledge
is treated as a greatest ﬁxed point. This paper is a preliminary step towards such a system. We argue
that the standard induction rule is not well suited to axiomatize evidence-based common knowledge. As an
alternative, we study two diﬀerent deductive systems for the logic of common knowledge. The ﬁrst system
makes use of an induction axiom whereas the second one is based on co-inductive proof theory. We show
the soundness and completeness for both systems.
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1 Introduction
Justiﬁcation logics [6] are epistemic logics that explicitly include justiﬁcations for
an agent’s knowledge. Historically, Artemov [3,4] developed the ﬁrst of these logics,
the Logic of Proofs, to solve the problem of a provability semantics for S4. Fitting’s
model construction [11] provides a natural epistemic semantics for the Logic of
Proofs, which can be generalized to the whole family of justiﬁcation logics. It
augments Kripke models with a function that speciﬁes admissible evidence for each
formula at a given state.
Instead of the simple A is known, justiﬁcation logics formalize t is a justiﬁcation
for A. Thus, these logics feature evidence-based knowledge and enable us to reason
about the evidence. This novel approach has many applications. For instance, it
makes it possible to tackle the logical omniscience problem [7] and to deal with
certain forms of self-referentiality [12].
The notion of common knowledge is essential in the area of multi-agent systems,
where coordination among a set of agents is a central issue. The textbooks [10,14]
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provide excellent introductions to epistemic logics in general and common knowl-
edge in particular. Informally, common knowledge of a proposition A is deﬁned as
the inﬁnitary conjunction everybody knows A and everybody knows that everybody
knows A and so on. This is equivalent to saying that common knowledge of A is
the greatest ﬁxed point of λX.(everybody knows A and everybody knows X). The
standard approach to axiomatizing this property is by means of a co-closure axiom
(see Deﬁnition 2.1) and the following induction rule (see, for instance, [10]):
A → E(A ∧B)
A → CB (I-R1)
A justiﬁed common knowledge operator was introduced by Artemov in [5]. How-
ever, his operator does not capture the greatest solution of the corresponding ﬁxed
point equation. The relation between the classical and the justiﬁed versions of
common knowledge is studied in [2].
Our long-term goal is to come up with an evidence-based version of common
knowledge where common knowledge is treated as a greatest ﬁxed point. However,
using a rule akin to (I-R1) in a justiﬁcation logic makes it diﬃcult to show that
the resulting logic enjoys internalization, the property that states that the logic
internalizes its own notion of proof, which is central to the Realization Theorem.
We believe that in order to achieve our aim it is necessary to consider alternative
formalizations of common knowledge. In this paper, we will examine two such ap-
proaches. The ﬁrst is based on induction whereas the second employs co-induction.
The ﬁrst system we study includes an induction axiom instead of the rule (I-R1).
This axiom was proposed in [14], where a semantic completeness proof is given. We
investigate the proof-theoretic relationship between this axiom and (I-R1) thereby
providing an alternative completeness proof.
Common knowledge is equivalent to an inﬁnitary conjunction. Therefore, it
seems plausible that a justiﬁcation term for common knowledge is an inﬁnitely long
term, i.e., a co-inductive term. To support this approach, we introduce a co-in-
ductive system S for common knowledge. In this formal system, proofs may have
inﬁnite branches. Such systems have previously been studied, for example, for the
μ-calculus [15,18] and the linear time μ-calculus [9]. The underlying idea of this
approach is based on the fundamental semantic theorem of the modal μ-calculus [8]
(due to Streett and Emerson [17]). A similar result was also developed in [16].
Our completeness proof for the inﬁnitary system S is performed along the lines
of [15] utilizing the determinacy of certain inﬁnite games. Alternatively, we could
use the completeness of the common knowledge system with an ω-rule [1]. The
transformation from ω-rules to inﬁnite branches then would yield the completeness
of S (see [18] for this approach in the context of the μ-calculus).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the lan-
guage and semantics for the logic of common knowledge. We recall the deductive
system HR from [10], which is based on (I-R1). In Section 3, we present the sys-
tem HAx, which includes the induction axiom from [14]. We then study a proof-
theoretic reduction of HR to HAx, thus providing the completeness of HAx. The
S. Bucheli et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 262 (2010) 83–9884
system S that features proofs with inﬁnite branches is introduced in Section 4. We
establish the soundness and completeness of S by employing techniques from the
proof of the fundamental semantic theorem and results about inﬁnite games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Language and Semantics
We consider a language with h agents for some h > 0. This language will be ﬁxed
throughout the paper, and h will always denote the number of agents. Proposi-
tions P and their negations P are atoms. Formulae are denoted by A,B,C. They
are given by the following grammar
A ::= P | P | A ∧A | A ∨A | iA | iA | CA | C˜A ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ h. The formula iA is read as agent i knows A, and the formula CA
is read as A is common knowledge. The connectives i and C have i and C˜ as their
respective duals. The negation ¬A of a formula A is deﬁned in the usual way by
using De Morgan’s laws, the law of double negation, and the duality laws for modal
operators. We also deﬁne A → B := ¬A ∨B and A ↔ B := (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
The formula EA is an abbreviation for everybody knows A:
EA := 1A ∧ · · · ∧hA and E˜A := 1A ∨ · · · ∨hA .
A Kripke structure M is a tuple (S,R1, . . . , Rh, π), where S is a non-empty set of
states, each Ri is a binary relation on S, and π is a valuation function that assigns
to each atomic formula a set of states such that π
(
P
)
= S \ π(P ).
Given a Kripke structureM = (S,R1 . . . , Rh, π) and states v, w ∈ S, we say that
w is reachable from v in n steps (reach(v, w, n)) if there exist states s0, . . . , sn such
that s0 = v, sn = w, and for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1 there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ h with Ri(sj , sj+1).
We say w is reachable from v if there exists an n with reach(v, w, n).
LetM = (S,R1 . . . , Rh, π) be a Kripke structure and v ∈ S be a state. We deﬁne
the satisfaction relation M, v |= A inductively on the structure of the formula A:
M, v |= P if v ∈ π(P ),
M, v |= P if v ∈ π (P ) ,
M, v |= A ∧B if M, v |= A and M, v |= B,
M, v |= A ∨B if M, v |= A or M, v |= B,
M, v |= iA if M, w |= A for all w such that Ri(v, w),
M, v |= iA if M, w |= A for some w with Ri(v, w),
M, v |= CA if M, w |= A for all w such that (∃n ≥ 1)reach(v, w, n),
M, v |= C˜A if M, w |= A for some w with (∃n ≥ 1)reach(v, w, n).
We writeM |= A ifM, v |= A for all v ∈ S. A formula A is called valid ifM |= A for
all Kripke structures M. A formula A is called satisﬁable if M, v |= A for some
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Kripke structure M and some state v.
2.2 Deductive System
Let us brieﬂy recall the deﬁnition of the system for common knowledge that makes
use of the induction rule.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [The system HR] The Hilbert calculus HR for the logic of common
knowledge is deﬁned by the following axioms and inference rules:
Propositional axioms: All instances of propositional tautologies
Modus ponens: For all formulae A and B,
A A → B
B
(MP)
Modal axioms: For all formulae A and B and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
i(A → B) → (iA → iB) (K)
Necessitation rule: For all formulae A and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
A
iA
(Nec)
Co-closure axiom: For all formulae A,
CA → E(A ∧ CA) (Co-Cl)
Induction rule: For all formulae A and B,
B → E(A ∧B)
B → CA (I-R1)
We have the following standard result, see [10].
Theorem 2.2 (Soundness and completeness of HR) For any formula A,
HR 
 A if and only if A is valid.
3 The Inductive Way
3.1 Deductive System
We now introduce a deductive system for common knowledge where the induction
rule is replaced by an induction axiom. To obtain a complete system, we also need
to include a normality axiom and a necessitation rule for the common knowledge
operator.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [The system HAx] The Hilbert calculus HAx consists of the axioms
and rules of HR whereby (I-R1) is replaced by the following axioms and rule:
S. Bucheli et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 262 (2010) 83–9886
C-modal axiom: For all formulae A and B,
C(A → B) → (CA → CB) (C-K)
C-necessitation rule: For all formulae A,
A
CA
(C-Nec)
Induction axiom: For all formulae A,
EA ∧ C(A → EA) → CA (I-Ax)
In [14], an induction axiom is introduced as A ∧ C(A → EA) → CA. However, in
our setting, the axiom from [14] would not be sound since we do not deﬁne common
knowledge to be reﬂexive.
3.2 Soundness
The soundness of HAx is easily obtained.
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness) For any formula A, if HAx 
 A, then A is valid.
Proof. As usual, by induction on the length of the derivation of HAx 
 A. We only
show the case where A is the induction axiom. Let M be a Kripke structure. We
show by induction on n that for all n ≥ 1, if M, v |= EA ∧ C(A → EA), then for all
states w with reach(v, w, n), we have M, w |= A. If n = 1, then M, v |= EA guar-
antees M, w |= A. For n = m + 1, m ≥ 1, let w be such that reach(v, w, n). Then
there exists v′ such that
(i) reach(v, v′,m) and
(ii) reach(v′, w, 1).
From (i) and M, v |= C(A → EA) we obtain M, v′ |= A → EA. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, we get M, v′ |= A. Therefore, M, v′ |= EA. Thus, by (ii), we
get M, w |= A. 
3.3 Completeness
In order to establish the completeness of HAx, we have to introduce an intermedi-
ate system Hint. We ﬁrst reduce HR to Hint and then reduce Hint to HAx. These
reductions reveal the proof-theoretic relationship between the induction axiom and
the induction rule. Moreover, it follows that the completeness of HR implies the
completeness of HAx.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [The system Hint] Hint consists of the axioms and rules of HR where-
by (I-R1) is replaced by the following axiom and rule:
C-distributivity: For all formulae A and B,
C(A ∧B) → (CA ∧ CB) (C-Dis)
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Induction rule 2: For all formulae A,
A → EA
EA → CA (I-R2)
Lemma 3.4 For each formula A, we have that HR 
 A implies Hint 
 A.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that (I-R1) is derivable in Hint. Assume
Hint 
 B → E(A ∧B) . (1)
Then Hint 
 A ∧B → E(A ∧B). By (I-R2), we obtain that
Hint 
 E(A ∧B) → C(A ∧B) .
Using (C-Dis), we get Hint 
 E(A ∧ B) → CA. Finally, (1) yields Hint 
 B → CA,
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.5 For each formula A, we have that Hint 
 A implies HAx 
 A.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that (C-Dis) is derivable in HAx. The following formula is an
instance of (C-K):
HAx 
 C(A ∧B → B) → (C(A ∧B) → CB) . (2)
HAx 
 A∧B → B is a propositional axiom. By (C-Nec), HAx 
 C(A∧B → B). By (2),
we have HAx 
 C(A ∧B) → CB. A similar argument yields HAx 
 C(A ∧B) → CA.
The last two statements together imply that (C-Dis) is derivable in HAx.
It remains to show that (I-R2) is derivable in HAx. Assume that HAx 
 A → EA.
By (C-Nec), we get HAx 
 C(A → EA). Thus, the derivability of (I-R2) follows
from (I-Ax). 
The two lemmas, together with the completeness of HR, give us the completeness
of HAx.
Corollary 3.6 (Completeness of HAx) For all formulae A, if A is valid, then
HAx 
 A.
4 The Co-Inductive Way
4.1 Deductive System
We now introduce the inﬁnitary system S for common knowledge. In this formal
system, proofs are ﬁnitely branching trees that may have inﬁnitely long branches
while all ﬁnite branches must still end in an axiom. In order to obtain a sound
deductive system, we have to impose a global constraint on such inﬁnite branches.
Roughly, we require that on every inﬁnite branch in a proof, there be a greatest
ﬁxed point unfolded inﬁnitely often.
We consider sequents to be ﬁnite sets of formulae and denote them by Γ,Δ,Σ.
For a sequent Δ = {A1, . . . , An}, we denote the sequent {iA1, . . . ,iAn} by iΔ
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and the sequent {E˜A1, . . . , E˜An} by E˜Δ. In addition, M, v |= Δ is understood
as M, v |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨An.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A preproof for a sequent Γ is a possibly inﬁnite tree whose root is
labeled with Γ and which is built according to the following axioms and rules:
Axioms: For all sequents Γ and all propositions P ,
Γ, P, P (ax)
Propositional rules: For all sequents Γ and all formulae A and B,
Γ, A,B
Γ, A ∨B (∨)
Γ, A Γ, B
Γ, A ∧B (∧)
Modal rules: For all sequents Γ and Σ, all formulae A, and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
Γ, A
iΓ,iA,Σ
()
Fixed point rules: For all sequents Γ and all formulae A,
Γ, E˜A ∨ E˜C˜A
Γ, C˜A
(C˜)
Γ,EA ∧ ECA
Γ,CA
(C)
We now introduce the notion of a thread in a branch of a proof tree.
Deﬁnition 4.2 The principal formula of a rule is the formula that is explicitly
displayed in the conclusion of the rule. The active formulae of a rule are those
formulae that are explicitly displayed in the premise(s) of the rule. The formulae
in Γ and Σ are called the side formulae of a rule.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Consider a proof tree for some sequent. For all rule applications r
that occur in this proof tree, we deﬁne a connection relation Con(r) on formulae as
follows:
(i) In the case when r is not an application of (), we deﬁne (A,B) ∈ Con(r) if
A = B and A is a side formula of r or if A is the principal formula and B is
an active formula of r.
(ii) In the case when r is an application of (), we deﬁne (iA,A) ∈ Con(r) ifiA is
the principal formula of r and we deﬁne (iB,B) ∈ Con(r) if iB ∈ iΓ.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Consider a ﬁnite or inﬁnite branch Γ0,Γ1, . . . in a proof tree. Let
ri be the rule application where Γi is the conclusion and Γi+1 is a premise. A thread
in this branch is a sequence of formulae A0, A1, . . . such that (Ai, Ai+1) ∈ Con(ri)
and Ai ∈ Γi for every i. Note that a thread in an inﬁnite branch may be ﬁnite or
inﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 4.5 Consider an inﬁnite branch of a preproof for a sequent Γ. An
inﬁnite thread in this branch is called a C-thread if inﬁnitely many of its formulae
are the principal formulae of applications of (C).
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(ax’)
¬A,A
(E)
E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),EA
(ax’)
¬A,A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),CA
... (C)
¬A, E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),CA
(∧)
¬A,A ∧ E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),CA
(E)
E˜¬A, E˜(A ∧ E˜¬A), E˜C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),ECA
(∨)
E˜¬A, E˜(A ∧ E˜¬A) ∨ E˜C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),ECA
(C˜)
E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),ECA
(∧)
E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),EA ∧ ECA
(C)
E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),CA
Fig. 1. A sample S-proof for the induction axiom (I-Ax) with a highlighted C-thread.
Deﬁnition 4.6 An S-proof for a sequent Γ is a preproof for Γ such that every
ﬁnite branch ends in an axiom and every inﬁnite branch contains a C-thread. We
write S 
 Γ if there exists an S-proof for Γ.
We will illustrate how S-proofs work by deriving the induction axiom in S. In
order to present this derivation in a compact form, we need to state some properties
of the system. It should be noted that the proof of Lemma 4.7(ii) requires inﬁnite
derivations, e.g., in the case of A = CB.
Lemma 4.7 (i) For all formulae A and all sequents Γ and Σ, the following analog
of the ()-rule is derivable in S:
Γ, A
E˜Γ,EA,Σ
(E)
(ii) For all formulae A and all sequents Γ, the following generalized form of ax-
ioms (ax) is derivable:
S 
 Γ, A,¬A (ax’)
Example 4.8 Fig. 1 contains the bottom part of an inﬁnite S-proof for the induc-
tion axiom (I-Ax) expressed in a sequent form as E˜¬A, C˜(A∧ E˜¬A), CA. Two of the
three topmost sequents shown are labeled (ax’) and are derivable by Lemma 4.7(ii).
The only inﬁnite branch outside of (ax’)-derivations has inﬁnitely many repetitions
of the sequent ¬A, E˜¬A, C˜(A ∧ E˜¬A),CA. To show that this preproof is indeed an
S-proof, it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a C-thread in this branch. The thread that consists
of the red underlined formulae is such a C-thread.
4.2 Soundness
The soundness proof essentially uses the idea that underlies the fundamental se-
mantic theorem of the modal μ-calculus.
Let δ(A) be the maximal number of nested C operators in the formula A: for
instance, δ(C(CP ∨ CQ)) = 2. Given m ≥ 1 and a sequence σ = (σm, . . . , σ1) of
ordinals, for all formulae A such that δ(A) ≤ m, we deﬁne the satisfaction rela-
tion |=σC in the same way as |= except in the case of C, where we set M, v |=σC CB if
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M, w |=σC B for all w for which there exists n with σδ(CB) ≥ n ≥ 1 and reach(v, w, n).
We immediately obtain
M, v |=(σm,...,σδ(CB)+1,...,σ1)C CB iff M, v |=
(σm,...,σδ(CB),...,σ1)
C EB ∧ ECB . (3)
It is suﬃcient to consider only ordinals ≤ ω, but ω itself as a possible element of a
sequence σ is necessary to guarantee that for all formulae A,
M, v |= A implies that there exists σ such that M, v |=σC A . (4)
Lemma 4.9 Let A be a formula, Δ be a sequent, σ be a sequence of ordinals,
M = (S,R1, . . . , Rh, π) be a Kripke structure, v ∈ S be a state, and 1 ≤ i ≤ h. If
M, v |= iA,iΔ and M, v |=σC iA, then there exists a state w ∈ S with Ri(v, w)
such that M, w |= A,Δ and M, w |=σC A.
Proof. Suppose for all w ∈ S with Ri(v, w), at least one of the claimsM, w |= A,Δ
or M, w |=σC A holds. We distinguish the following two cases:
(i) M, w |=σC A holds for all w ∈ S with Ri(v, w). Then we have M, v |=σC iA.
Contradiction.
(ii) There is at least one w ∈ S with Ri(v, w) such that M, w |=σC A. Then
M, w |= A. Hence, there must be a formula B ∈ Δ such that M, w |= B.
However, this meansM, v |= iB and, therefore,M, v |= iΔ. Contradiction.

Given two sequences σ and τ of the same length m, we say σ < τ if σ is smaller
than τ with respect to the lexicographic ordering. Since we consider sequences of a
ﬁxed length, the relation < is a well-ordering.
Theorem 4.10 (Soundness) For all formulae A, if A is not valid, then S  A.
Proof. Suppose A is not valid yet there is an S-proof T for it. Then there is a
Kripke structure M and a state s such that M, s |= A, which will be used to
construct a branch Γ0,Γ1, . . . with the corresponding inferences r0, r1, . . . in T and
a sequence s0, s1, . . . of states in M such that
(a) M, si |= Γi and
(b) if (B,C) ∈ Con(ri), C ∈ Γi+1, and M, si |=σC B, then M, si+1 |=σC C.
Let Γ0 := A and s0 := s. If Γi and si are given, we construct Γi+1 and si+1 according
to the diﬀerent cases for ri. Note that because of (a) Γi cannot be axiomatic and
thus must have been inferred by some rule.
(i) ri = (): Let iB ∈ Γi be the principal formula of ri. Let σ be the least
sequence such that M, si |=σC iB. We apply Lemma 4.9 for this σ to ﬁnd a
state si+1 such that (a) and (b) hold. We let Γi+1 be the unique premise of ri.
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(ii) ri = (∧): Let B1 ∧ B2 ∈ Γi be the principal formula of ri. Let σ be the least
sequence such that M, si |=σC B1 ∧B2. Let Γi+1 be the j-th premise of ri such
that M, si |=σC Bj . Further, set si+1 := si. This construction guarantees (a)
and (b).
(iii) In all other cases, ri has a unique premise Δ. We set si+1 := si and Γi+1 := Δ.
Again (a) and (b) hold.
We have constructed an inﬁnite branch in T . Since T is an S-proof, this branch
must contain a C-thread A0, A1, . . . . For each natural number j, we deﬁne σj to be
the least sequence such that M, sj |=σjC Aj . Note that σj exists by (4). It follows
from (b) that σj+1 ≤ σj for all j. Moreover, because we consider a C-thread, there
are inﬁnitely many applications of (C), which, according to (3), means that there are
inﬁnitely many j’s with σj+1 < σj . This contradicts the well-foundedness of <. 
4.3 Completeness
The completeness proof for the inﬁnitary system S is based on [15], where a similar
result is shown for the modal μ-calculus. For a given formula A, we deﬁne an inﬁnite
game such that player I has a winning strategy if and only if there is an S-proof
for A and player II has a winning strategy if and only if there is a countermodel
for A. It is possible to show that this game is determined, i.e., one of the players
has a winning strategy. Hence, the completeness of S follows.
Deﬁnition 4.11 A sequent Γ is saturated if all of the following conditions hold:
(i) if A ∧B ∈ Γ, then A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ,
(ii) if A ∨B ∈ Γ, then A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ,
(iii) if CA ∈ Γ, then EA ∧ ECA ∈ Γ, and
(iv) if C˜A ∈ Γ, then E˜A ∨ E˜C˜A ∈ Γ.
Deﬁnition 4.12 The system SGame consists of the rules of S whereby () is replaced
by the following rules:
Alternative modal rules: Let 1 ≤ m ≤ h, H = {h1, . . . , hm} ⊆ {1, . . . , h}, and
nh1 , . . . , nhm be positive integers. For all saturated sequents Σ that contain neither
formulae that start with j , j ∈ H, nor formulae that start with i, 1 ≤ i ≤ h, all
sequents Γj , j ∈ H, and all formulae Aj,1, . . . , Aj,nj , j ∈ H,
Γh1 , Ah1,1 . . . Γh1 , Ah1,nh1 . . . Γhm , Ahm,1 . . . Γhm , Ahm,nhm
h1Γh1 ,h1Ah1,1, . . . ,h1Ah1,nh1 , . . . ,hmΓhm ,hmAhm,1, . . . ,hmAhm,nhm ,Σ
(′)
Note that this rule has nh1 + · · ·+ nhm many premises.
An SGame-tree for a sequent Γ is built by iterating the following two steps until
one reaches a saturated sequent which is either axiomatic or to which (′) cannot
be applied:
(i) Apply the rules (∨), (∧), (C), and (C˜) backwards until a saturated sequent
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is reached. While applying the rules, make sure that the conclusion always
remains a subset of the premise.
(ii) Apply (′) backwards, if possible.
We now introduce a system SDis for establishing unprovability. Accordingly, its
rules should not be read as sound, i.e., preserving validity, but rather as “dis-sound,”
i.e., preserving invalidity.
Deﬁnition 4.13 The system SDis consists of the rules of SGame whereby (∧) is
replaced by the following two rules:
Alternative (∧): For all sequents Γ and all formulae A and B,
Γ, A
Γ, A ∧B (∧1)
Γ, B
Γ, A ∧B (∧2)
An SDis-tree is built in the same way as an SGame-tree except that (∧1) and
(∧2) are used instead of (∧). Therefore, an SDis-tree for a sequent Γ is not unique.
The notions of a thread and a C-thread are extended to SGame- and SDis-trees. A
C˜-thread is a thread that contains inﬁnitely many principal formulae of applications
of (C˜). Note that any inﬁnite thread is either a C- or a C˜-thread but not both.
Deﬁnition 4.14 We say that an SDis-tree T for a sequent Γ disproves Γ if
(i) no branch ends with an axiom and
(ii) any inﬁnite thread in any branch is a C˜-thread.
Example 4.15 In order to disprove C˜P → C˜CP , we construct an SDis-tree T for a
corresponding sequent CP, C˜CP (see Fig. 2). In this tree, 1CP,1C˜CP,1P,Σ is
a saturation of the sequent
CP,EP ∧ ECP,EP, C˜CP, E˜CP ∨ E˜C˜CP, E˜CP, E˜C˜CP . (5)
The saturation process is abbreviated as (∗). It involves exactly 2h−2 applications
of (∨) to saturate the disjunctions E˜CP and E˜C˜CP . In addition, the conjunction EP
is saturated by at most h−1 applications of (∧1) and (∧2) in such a way that 1P is
the only resulting formula that starts with i. Most formulae that result from
this saturation are disjunctions, conjunctions, or are already present in (5), with
the exception of 1CP, . . . ,hCP,1C˜CP, . . . ,hC˜CP, and 1P . Thus, Σ contains
neither formulae that start with i nor formulae that start with 1, which enables
us to apply (′). The tree T extends upward indeﬁnitely with inﬁnitely many
repetitions of the sequent CP, C˜CP, P . This tree has only one branch, which is
inﬁnite. And this branch contains only one inﬁnite thread, the one that consists of
the red underlined formulae in Fig. 2. And this thread is indeed a C˜-thread.
It may seem that this branch also contains a C-thread because there are inﬁnitely
many applications of (C) in the branch. However, the principal formulae of these
(C)-rules do not belong to one thread. In particular, the thread that starts from CP
in the root sequent does not pass through CP in the premise of the (′)-rule shown
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...
(C)
CP, C˜CP, P
(′)
1CP,1C˜CP ,1P,Σ
... (∗)
CP,EP ∧ ECP,EP, C˜CP, E˜CP ∨ E˜C˜CP, E˜CP, E˜C˜CP
(∨)
CP,EP ∧ ECP,EP, C˜CP, E˜CP ∨ E˜C˜CP
(C˜)
CP,EP ∧ ECP,EP, C˜CP
(∧1)
CP,EP ∧ ECP, C˜CP
(C)
CP, C˜CP
Fig. 2. A sample SDis-disproof for C˜P → C˜CP with a highlighted C˜-thread.
in Fig. 2. Instead, this thread passes through EP ∧ ECP , EP , . . . , 1P , and P and
eventually disappears after the next application of (′).
Now we are going to show that any sequent Γ has either an S-tree that proves
it or an SDis-tree that disproves it.
Let T be an SGame-tree for Γ. We deﬁne an inﬁnite game for two players on T .
Intuitively, player I will try to show that Γ is provable while player II will try to
show the opposite. The game is played as follows:
(i) the game starts at the root of T ,
(ii) at any (′) node, player I chooses one of the children,
(iii) at any (∧) node, player II chooses one of the children,
(iv) at all other non-leaf nodes, the only child is chosen by default.
Such a game results in a path in T . In the case of a ﬁnite path, player I wins if the
path ends in an axiom; otherwise, player II wins. In the case of an inﬁnite path,
player I wins if the path contains a C-thread; otherwise, player II wins.
Theorem 4.16 (i) There is a winning strategy for player I if and only if there is
an S-proof for Γ contained in T .
(ii) There is a winning strategy for player II if and only if there is an SDis-disproof
for Γ contained in T .
Proof. For the ﬁrst claim, if there is an S-proof for Γ contained in T , then the
winning strategy for player I is to stay in the nodes that belong to this proof. For
the other direction, consider a winning strategy for player I. It induces an S-proof
for Γ as follows: the root of T is the root of the proof; if a node is included in the
proof and player I has to perform the next move, then we select the child prescribed
by the winning strategy; if it is player II’s move, then we include all the children in
our proof. The proof of the second claim is similar. 
With the help of Martin’s theorem [13] we can show that this game is determined,
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1CP,1C˜CP,1P,Σ, P •
1

P
1CP,1C˜CP,1P,Σ, P •
1

P
1CP,1C˜CP,1P,Σ •
1

P
Fig. 3. The Kripke structure MT induced by the SDis-tree T from Example 4.15.
i.e., one of the players has a winning strategy. For details of this argument, see [9,15].
We obtain the following as a corollary:
Theorem 4.17 Let T be an SGame-tree for Γ. Then there exists either an S-proof
for Γ in T or an SDis-disproof for Γ in T .
It remains to show that from a given SDis-disproof for Γ, we can construct a
countermodel for Γ.
Deﬁnition 4.18 Consider an SDis-tree T that disproves a sequent Γ. The Kripke
structure MT = (ST , RT1 , . . . , RTh , πT ) induced by T is deﬁned as follows:
(i) ST consists of all occurrences of sequents in the conclusions of applications
of (′) in T as well as of all occurrences of sequents in the leaves of T ,
(ii) RTi (Γ,Δ) holds if there is exactly one application of (
′) in between Γ and Δ
and if there is a thread through Γ and Δ that contains iA ∈ Γ and A ∈ Δ
for some formula A,
(iii) πT (P ) := {Γ ∈ ST : P /∈ Γ}.
We can assign to each sequent Δ in T the corresponding state in ST simply by
ﬁnding the closest saturated descendant. We will denote this state by sat(Δ).
Example 4.19 The SDis-tree T constructed in Example 4.15 for C˜P → C˜CP in-
duces a Kripke structure MT shown in Fig. 3. It is easy to see that
MT , 1CP,1C˜CP,1P,Σ |= C˜P → C˜CP .
Lemma 4.20 states that this is a general phenomenon: the root of the Kripke struc-
ture induced by a given SDis-tree falsiﬁes the sequent at the root of the tree.
We deﬁne δ˜(A) to be the maximal number of nested C˜ operators in A. Consider
a Kripke structure M, a state s, and a formula A. Let the C˜-signature sigC˜(A, s) be
the least sequence σ = (σδ˜(A), . . . , σ1) such that M, s |=σC˜ A. Here |=σC˜ is deﬁned in
the same way as |= except in the case of C˜, where we setM, v |=σ
C˜
C˜B ifM, w |=σ
C˜
B
for some w for which there exists n with σδ˜(C˜B) ≥ n ≥ 1 and reach(v, w, n).
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Lemma 4.20 Consider an SDis-tree T that disproves the sequent Γ = {A} for some
formula A. Then MT , sat(Γ) |= A.
Proof. Suppose that MT , sat(Γ) |= A. Then we can construct a C-thread in some
branch of T , which contradicts the assumption that T disproves A. We will si-
multaneously construct a branch Γ1,Γ2, . . . and a thread A1, A2, . . . in it such that
MT , sat(Γn) |= An for all n. (6)
We start with Γ1 := Γ and A1 := A. Now assume that we have constructed the
thread up to some element An ∈ Γn with MT , sat(Γn) |= An. The next element is
selected as follows:
(i) If a rule diﬀerent from (′) has been applied, then there is only one child of Γn
and we let Γn+1 be that child. We have sat(Γn) = sat(Γn+1) and distinguish
the following cases:
(a) An is not the principal formula. We set An+1 := An.
(b) An = B ∨ C is the principal formula. We set An+1 := B if
sigC˜(B ∨ C, sat(Γn)) = sigC˜(B, sat(Γn+1)) ;
otherwise, we set An+1 := C.
(c) An = B∧C is the principal formula. We set An+1 := B if B occurs in Γn+1;
otherwise, we set An+1 := C.
(d) An = CB is the principal formula. Let An+1 := EB ∧ ECB.
(e) An = C˜B is the principal formula. Let An+1 := E˜B ∨ E˜C˜B.
(ii) If (′) has been applied, then we have sat(Γn) = Γn. We distinguish the
following cases:
(a) An = iB. There is a child where B is the active formula. Let Γn+1 be
that child and set An+1 := B.
(b) An = iB. Because of MT , sat(Γn) |= An, there exists a state t such
that RTi (sat(Γn), t) and sigC˜(B, t) = sigC˜(iB, sat(Γn)). The deﬁnition
of MT implies that there is a child Γ′ of Γn with sat(Γ′) = t. We set
Γn+1 := Γ′ and An+1 := B.
(c) An is not of the form iB or iB. Then there exists A′n ∈ Γn that is of
this form such that MT ,Γn |= A′n. We drop the thread constructed so far
and continue instead with the thread from A to A′n.
If the constructed thread were ﬁnite, then the last element Γn of the path would nec-
essarily be a saturated sequent which would not contain formulae of the form iB.
Then the deﬁnition of MT would imply that MT ,Γn |= An, which would contra-
dict (6). Hence, the constructed thread is inﬁnite. We can now use an argument
about signatures similar to the one used in the soundness proof for S to show that
the constructed thread cannot be a C˜-thread. This contradicts the assumption that
T disproves Γ. 
Theorem 4.21 (Completeness of S) If A is a valid formula, then there exists
an S-proof for it.
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Proof. Let A be a formula that is not provable in S. By Theorem 4.17, there exists
an SDis-tree that disproves A. Thus, by Lemma 4.20, there exists a countermodel
for A. Hence, A is not valid. 
5 Conclusions
We have presented two systems HAx and S for common knowledge, which could be
used to construct a justiﬁcation counterpart for common knowledge. It appears
that HAx is more suitable for this task than HR as the latter has an additional rule,
(I-R1), which may make it diﬃcult to prove constructive necessitation, a property
essential for justiﬁcation logics. However, to establish a connection between the
modal logic of common knowledge and its justiﬁcation counterpart, the so-called
Realization Theorem, a cut-free sequent calculus (akin to S) for the modal logic is
ordinarily required. Furthermore, the system S might give us more insight into the
nature of common knowledge evidence terms.
The idea of treating common knowledge evidence terms as co-inductive struc-
tures seems conceptually appealing but requires further investigation into the re-
lationship between HAx and S. In particular, syntactic cut-elimination is vital for
embedding HAx into S, which could shed a new light on how common knowledge
emerges.
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